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Abstract. Equilibrium models imply that the real value of debt in the hands of
the public must equal the expected present-value of surpluses. Empirical models of
ﬁscal policy typically do not impose this condition and often do not even include
debt. Absence of debt from empirical models can produce non-invertible represen-
tations, obscuring the true present-value relation, even if it holds in the data. First,
we show that small VAR models of ﬁscal policy may not be invertible and that
expanding the information set to include government debt has quantitatively im-
portant implications. Then we impose the present-value condition on an identiﬁed
VAR and characterize the way in which the present-value support of debt varies
across types of ﬁscal shocks. The role of expected primary surpluses in supporting
innovations to debt depends on the nature of the shock. Debt is supported almost
entirely by changes in the present-value of surpluses for some ﬁscal shocks, but for
other ﬁscal shocks surpluses fail to adjust, leaving a large role for expected changes
in discount rates. Horizons over which debt innovations are ﬁnanced are long—on
the order of 50 years or more.
1. Introduction
The government’s present-value budget constraint is an attractive vehicle for ra-
tionalizing macroeconomic responses to ﬁscal policy because the taxes and transfers
components of the present-value relation directly impact forward-looking households
through their own present-value constraints. It follows that to understand why house-
holds with rational expectations respond in certain ways to ﬁscal policy shocks, it is
valuable to examine how these households perceive their present-value tax burden as
evolving. Moreover, to understand why forward-looking households are content to
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hold government debt at prevailing market prices, it is essential to know how viola-
tions of the household transversality conditions are avoided, and this means learning
how the government present-value relation is satisﬁed.
Rational expectations implies that economic agents’ beliefs about how future ﬁscal
policy will adjust to innovations in government debt play a crucial role in deter-
mining the resulting equilibrium. Prominent examples where theoretical conclusions
about macro policy hinge on such beliefs include Ricardian equivalence, “Unpleasant
Monetarist Arithmetic,” and the ﬁscal theory of the price level.
1 In striking con-
trast, empirical studies are either mute, as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and the
identiﬁed VAR work that followed, or build in the assumption that net surpluses or
total tax revenues clear the government budget constraint [Bohn (1998), Davig and
Leeper (2006), or Favero and Monacelli (2005)]. This paper oﬀers some new empirical
ﬁndings that connect more tightly to theoretical work.
Our desire to examine the historical sources of ﬁscal ﬁnancing leads us to include
government debt in an otherwise conventional ﬁscal VAR, like those estimated by
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2004), Canova and Pappas (2003), Mountford
and Uhlig (2005), and Caldara and Kamps (2006). Including debt has surprisingly
important implications for the impacts of ﬁscal disturbances on macroeconomic vari-
ables such as output and inﬂation. To understand why debt appears to matter so
much for the predictions of the VAR, we explore Hansen and Sargent’s (1991) caution
that estimated VARs may not be invertible, making it impossible to recover structural
shocks from current and past information in the VAR. Testing the “poor man’s in-
vertibility condition” of Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Watson
(2007), we ﬁnd that VARs without debt are not invertible relative to a larger model
that is rich enough to capture the government’s present-value ﬁnancing. By failing
to be invertible, the smaller VARs identify as exogenous ﬁscal shocks linear combina-
tions of future innovations, confounding both the timing and the composition of ﬁscal
disturbances. Adding investment makes the VAR nearly invertible, while adding debt
ensures invertibility.
2
It turns out that inferences about the dynamic impacts of ﬁscal disturbances de-
pend strongly on the information set of the estimated VAR. Output and investment
multipliers associated with government spending and taxes tend to be larger in the
broader VAR systems, while transfers have weaker real eﬀect in the large systems.
Expansions in expenditure components tend to have stronger price eﬀects in larger
1A very partial list of analyses in which intertemporal ﬁnancing of government debt is pivotal
includes Barro (1974), Sargent and Wallace (1981), Leeper (1991), Baxter and King (1993), Sims
(1998), Woodford (2001), and Leeper and Yang (2006).
2Another potential source of non-invertibility is emphasized by Leeper (1989) and Yang (2005,
2007): ﬁscal news may arrive well before ﬁscal policies are implemented and their eﬀects show up in
ﬁscal variables. We do not address this source.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 3
systems, while taxes have weaker price eﬀects in those systems. The ﬁnding about
invertibility and its implications for estimated ﬁscal impacts constitute the ﬁrst con-
tribution of the paper.
The second contribution stems from imposing the government’s intertemporal bud-
get constraint on the estimated VAR to answer the question posed by the paper’s title.
The constraint constitutes a set of cross-equation restrictions on the estimated VAR
coeﬃcients, in the spirit of rational expectations econometrics. With a consistent
accounting framework in hand, we examine how innovations in debt produced by ex-
ogenous shocks to government spending, transfers, and taxes have been expected to
be ﬁnanced intertemporally.
Fiscal ﬁnancing has been remarkably shock-dependent in the post-World War II
period in the United States. Tax hikes that lower debt have tended to be followed by
ﬁscal adjustments that reduced the present value of surpluses to support the reduced
value of debt. Discount rates have also moved to support debt, funding about one-
third of the change in debt. Debt-ﬁnanced spending increases, in contrast, have been
followed by a lower present value of surpluses, requiring discount rates to fall by
enough to both oﬀset the lower surpluses and support the elevated value of debt.
Transfers shocks that raise debt induce a suﬃciently strong response of taxes that
the present value of surpluses moves with debt; in this case, the present value of
discount rates moves strongly against the higher value of debt. Despite the diversity
of funding across ﬁscal disturbances, one common theme emerges: discount rates can
move substantially and constitute an important source of ﬁscal adjustment.
Diversity also marks the dynamics of ﬁscal adjustment induced by shocks to policy.
Fiscal policy is characterized by a high degree of persistence. Present-value balance
is seen only after a 50- to 100-year forecast horizon. For intermediate forecast hori-
zons, especially following spending and transfer shocks, the truncated present-value
of surpluses can be grossly out of line with the value of debt, making it appear that
policy fails to satisfy the government’s intertemporal constraint.
Our work is closely related to Giannitsarou and Scott (2006). That paper, how-
ever, is concerned with testing present-value balance, an eﬀort initiated by Hamilton
and Flavin (1986). Instead, we impose the linearized intertemporal government bud-
get constraint on an estimated identiﬁed VAR and study its implications for ﬁscal
ﬁnancing.
3 We focus on describing how present-value balance is achieved, contingent
on the realization of certain identiﬁed ﬁscal policy shocks. Our paper stresses the
need for a consistent accounting framework, under which the VAR estimates of the
present-value of surpluses exactly equals the value of outstanding debt.
3Favero and Giavazzi (2007) add government debt to an otherwise conventional ﬁscal VAR and
append a non-linear budget identity to accumulate debt. They do not impose the intertemporal
budget constraint as a set of cross-equation restrictions on the estimated VAR coeﬃcient.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 4
This paper is also closely related to Roberds (1991). Roberds includes a measure of
government debt in his empirical work to test whether the government’s present-value
condition holds in expectation. Although we impose the condition, both Roberds and
we avoid the impossibility result of Hansen, Roberds, and Sargent (1991) by including
debt in the information set and applying the present-value condition in expectation.
While the constrained VAR impulse response functions do not lead to rejection of
the model at high levels of signiﬁcance, over long horizons the point estimates from
the constrained VAR are markedly diﬀerent from the unconstrained model, especially
with regard to output and prices, but also, importantly, with regard to the ﬁscal
policy instruments.
The ﬁndings of the paper have important implications for dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) modeling of ﬁscal policy. First, ﬁscal policy is multi-
dimensional, with elements of the policy block being funded in present-value in di-
verse ways, over widely varying time horizons. In particular, while tax shocks appear
to behave in the intuitive fashion (temporary tax cuts are rapidly paid for by tax in-
creases), spending and transfer shocks both involve sharp movements in the expected
discount rate, which are stabilizing for spending but not for transfers. Second, policy
shocks routinely elicit sizeable and persistent responses in all ﬁscal policy instruments
and this dynamic interaction is crucial for understanding how the resulting debt in-
novation is ﬁnanced. The result is that present-value balance is not apparent unless
forecasts are carried out for more than a century, in the case of spending and transfer
shocks. To date, estimated DSGE models specify ﬁscal sectors in ways that preclude
capturing the dynamic interactions present in U.S. data [Coenen and Straub (2004),
Forni, Monforte, and Sessa (2006), Kamps (2007)].
2. An Illustrative Model
This section uses a conventional DSGE model—a standard real business cycle
model—to derive a typical model’s implications for ﬁscal ﬁnancing dynamics and
to illustrate the computations we perform in the identiﬁed VARs below. Although
bare-bones, the model is adequate to our focus on the long-run aspects of ﬁscal ﬁ-
nance. More sophisticated versions of this model which are being ﬁt to data largely
consist of modiﬁcations of the bare-bones model that are designed to capture short-
run dynamics in data. Their long-run implications are likely to match closely those
of the simpler model we examine.
The model shows that in general the impacts of ﬁscal disturbances depend on how
the government budget constraint is expected to be satisﬁed in the long run, a point
that dates back at least to Christ (1968) and has found recent voice in Baxter and
King (1993), Sims (1998), and Leeper and Yang (2006). With a simple model inWHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 5
hand, we derive the sources of intertemporal ﬁnancing of government debt and the
horizons at which that funding occurs.






tu(Ct,1 − Nt), 0 < β < 1 (1)
with u(C,1 − N) = C1−γ/(1 − γ) + θ(1 − N)1−γN/(1 − γN), subject to
Ct + Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1 + Bt = (1 − τt)Yt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 + Zt, (2)
where Zt is lump-sum transfers (or taxes when Zt < 0). Goods are produced using a





{At} is the serially correlated technology process.
The aggregate resource constraint is
Ct + Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1 + Gt = Yt. (4)
Gt is government purchases of goods at t, and the government budget constraint is
Bt + τtYt = Gt + Zt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1, (5)
where Bt is the amount of one-period debt outstanding at t, which pays (1+rt)Bt at
t + 1. We let Tt ≡ τtYt denote total tax revenues.
Following existing empirical work on ﬁscal policy, we posit that policy obeys simple
rules that make ﬁscal variables respond contemporaneously to output and with a lag
to the state of government debt (written in log deviations from steady state):
ˆ gt = ϕGˆ yt − γGˆ bt−1 + u
G
t , (6)




ˆ zt = ϕZˆ yt − γZˆ bt−1 + u
Z
t . (8)
The u’s follow AR(1) processes. The output elasticities, the ϕ’s, are borrowed from
the empirical studies of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2004), and Leeper and
Yang (2004). We use the baseline parameter values described in table 1.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 6
2.2. Some Accounting. Let the equilibrium dynamics be characterized by factors
ft, evolving according to ft = ft−1A + ut, in terms of which the model variables are
xt = ftCx. In its log-linearized form, the present-value relation is




















where unsubscripted variables denote deterministic steady state values. This equa-
tion gives a decomposition of innovations to real debt into innovations to surplus
components, at constant discount rates, and into innovations in the real interest rate.
Using the equilibrium law of motion, the inﬁnite sum can be expressed as
















Denote innovations in xt by δxt ≡ xt − Et−1xt. Then
















It is also possible to compute the horizon over which an innovation to the ex-
pected present value of surpluses converges to the innovation in debt. Speciﬁcally,
suppose that the previous inﬁnite series is truncated at a horizon K. Again using the





















Expression (12) answers the question, “What fraction of a $1 innovation in debt at
time t is ﬁnanced by period t+K.” Of course, as K → ∞, expression (12) approaches
expression (11).
2.3. Dynamic Impacts of Fiscal Shocks. Many DSGE models follow the public
ﬁnance literature in studying the impacts of ﬁscal disturbances by assuming the gov-
ernment budget clears in some “neutral” manner, for example, through adjustments
in lump-sum taxes or transfers. That assumption implies setting γZ > 1/β − 1 and
γG = γτ = 0 in policy rules (6)-(8). Solid lines in ﬁgure 1 report the well-known
implications of a standard RBC model. Persistently higher government spending re-
duces wealth, which reduces consumption and induces greater work eﬀort, initially
raising output. Higher taxes reduce output, consumption, and investment. Ricardian
equivalence implies that lump-sum taxes do nothing to the real variables reported in
the ﬁgure.
Table 2 reports how an increase in debt brought forth by each of the three ﬁscal
shocks is expected to be ﬁnanced when transfers adjust. The table reports, for each
type of ﬁscal shock, what fraction of the resulting increase in debt is ﬁnanced by aWHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 7
present-value change in future ﬁscal variables or the discount rate. Not surprisingly,
serially correlated spending and tax shocks create expectations of present values of
spending and taxes that move in opposite directions from the initial change in debt.
Transfers move with debt, as the ﬁscal rule would suggest. Discount rate changes
account for a trivial fraction of the ﬁnancing of debt, a result that is ubiquitous
in this plain-vanilla speciﬁcation of the RBC model. The discount rate also moves
against the change in debt.
When government spending adjusts to clear the budget—γG = 1,γτ = γZ = 0—
important diﬀerences emerge in the impulse response functions, as dotted lines in
ﬁgure 1 show. An expectation that higher spending will reduce future spending
eliminates the expansionary eﬀects of higher spending and ameliorates the negative
wealth eﬀects on consumption, while it raises the capital stock in the future. When
higher current taxes portend higher future government spending, consumption falls
more markedly. Higher transfers now create the expectation of lower future spending,
which reduces work eﬀort and output, but raises consumption.
Finally, suppose that taxes adjust to ensure ﬁscal sustainability—γτ = 1,γG =
γZ = 0. Positive spending or transfer shocks, which are expected to generate higher
taxes in the future, now sharply reduce output, consumption, and capital [dashed lines
in ﬁgure 1]. Tax hikes, on the other hand, after initially reducing these variables, raise
them with a lag.4
The simple policy rules produce monotonic adjustments in funding over horizons
after which the serial correlation of the shocks has decayed. Figure 2 illustrates this
phenomenon in the case when only taxes adjust to debt. The smaller is the adjust-
ment parameter, the more prolonged is the adjustment process. At horizons beyond
about 10 periods, the innovation to the expected present value of surpluses converges
monotonically to the innovation in debt for each of the three ﬁscal disturbances.
3. The VAR Specification
This section discusses the identiﬁcation of the VAR models and the data used in
the estimation.
3.1. Identifying Fiscal Policy Shocks. As is well known, the reduced-form resid-
uals do not have straightforward economically meaningful interpretations. In order
to identify the linear combinations of reduced-form residuals that reﬂect exogenous
ﬁscal policy disturbances, we follow the method of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), as
extended by Perotti (2004).
4When either spending or taxes adjust to clear the budget, as in table 2, the present value of
discount rates accounts for a trivial share of the value of debt.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 8
Suppose that the reduced-form VAR is ft = B0 + ft−1B + ut and that one is
interested in recovering the structural form ftA0 = ¯ A + ft−1A + tJ, where J is a
block diagonal matrix with the ﬁrst block at the upper left corner a k-dimensional
matrix coupling the k ﬁscal policy shocks. Using the approach of Blanchard and
Perotti, one assumes that the reduced-form innovations to a ﬁscal policy instrument,
for example, taxes, ut(T), can be modeled as
ut(T) = ut(Y )AY,T + ut(π)Aπ,T + ut(R)AR,T + t(T) + t(G)JG,T + t(Z)JZ,T, (13)
where ut(Y ) is the residual associated with output, ut(π) the inﬂation residual, ut(R)
the interest rate residual and t(T), t(G), and t(Z) are the identiﬁed exogenous
ﬁscal shocks.
The coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst k columns in A in (13) are identiﬁed from institutional
information about automatic responses of the policy instrument in question. It then
is possible to obtain the covariance matrix of the ﬁscal policy matrix J. In order to
determine impact responses to the individual shocks, it is necessary to make assump-
tions concerning the relations among the ﬁscal shocks themselves. We assume that
the ﬁscal shocks are recursively ordered with taxes ﬁrst, followed by spending and
transfers. We shall refer to the shocks so ordered as “tax,” “spending” and “transfer”
shocks, but, of course, each shock will entail substantial movements in the other ﬁscal
policy instruments via endogenous propagation mechanisms.
Previous work in this literature has typically entered taxes net of transfers into the
VAR. We prefer to disaggregate taxes and transfers, because, on theoretical grounds,
distortionary taxes may lead to behavioral responses not characterized simply by
their impact on the present-value of lifetime resources. We follow the assumptions in
Perotti (2004); speciﬁcally, the price elasticity of real transfers is −1 and the output
elasticity of transfers is −.15. The output elasticity of taxes is therefore given by
αTY = (1 − Z
T )αnetTY + αZY
Z
T , with a similar equation for the inﬂation elasticity,
where Z/T is the steady state ratio of transfers to taxes. The calibrated elasticities
in the ﬁscal rules analogous to (13), which also draw on unpublished results from
Leeper and Yang (2004), appear in table 3.
3.2. The Data. We estimate quarterly VARs using U.S. data on some or all of the
following variables in log levels: real GDP, the GDP deﬂator, gross private domestic
investment, the three-month Treasury bill rate, the 10-year Treasury bond yield, the
monetary base, and ﬁscal variables. Fiscal data, which are for the Federal govern-
ment only, include taxes, transfers, spending, and debt (all NIPA).5 The data cover
the period from 1947:2 to 2006:2. Federal spending is deﬁned as the sum of Federal
5Ideally, ﬁscal variables would include Federal and state and local variables, as is typical in this
literature. But state and local governments generally have balanced-budget rules, while debt ﬁnanc-
ing is permitted only for certain capital expenditures. This suggests that ﬁscal-ﬁnancing decisionsWHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 9
consumption expenditure, gross investment and consumption of ﬁxed capital. Federal
taxes include all current tax receipts and contributions for social insurance. Finally,
net transfers include net current transfers, capital transfers, income from assets and
subsidies. The three-month T-bill rate is used for the sake of consistency with the
theoretical model, while the monetary base is necessary to complete the speciﬁcation
of the government budget constraint. Finally, the surplus components are adjusted
to better match the conceptual model described above. In particular, adjustments
are made to convert corporate income taxes from accrual to cash basis, to include
spending and revenue from U.S. territories and Puerto Rico and to include contri-
butions to Federal employee retirement funds. The quantitative importance of these
adjustments is small.6
To obtain a Federal debt series which obeys a ﬂow budget constraint, we accumulate
debt with the NIPA-deﬁned Federal net borrowing ﬁgure using the equation Vt −
Vt−1 = Net Borrowing − Seignorage, where V is the market value of government
debt, deﬁned in section 5. We validate this series by comparison to the market value
data produced by Cox and Hirschhorn (1983).7
The VAR features 5 lags of each endogenous variable and a constant, in order to
maintain, as much as possible, the framework of Perotti (2004), which serves as our
point of comparison to the existing literature.
4. The Invertibility of VAR Systems
The government present-value condition ties innovations in the market value of debt
together with changes in agents’ expectations concerning future primary surpluses and
discount rates. As has been recognized in other contexts (Hansen and Sargent (1991),
Lippi and Reichlin (1994), Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Wat-
son (2007)), however, there is no guarantee that the history of the shocks recovered
from an econometric model can capture the history of information ﬂows to households.
It turns out that non-invertibility wrecks havoc on present-value restrictions.
are likely to diﬀer substantially across Federal and state and local governments, so separating the
two levels of government seems reasonable.
6These adjustments are derived from NIPA table 3.18B. The data in this table are not seasonally
adjusted, unlike the data series that we employ elsewhere. We have used these corrections without
seasonal adjustment largely because they slightly improve the ﬁt between our generated series and
the Dallas Fed’s debt data set, as discussed in footnote 7.
7 The Cox and Hirschhorn data are available at http://www.dallasfed.org/data/data/natdebt.htm.
They construct a market value of debt series by computing Vt ≡
PJ
j=1 Bt(j)Qt(j) for maturities
j = 1,2,...,J. Because our empirical model includes NIPA-based measures of receipts and
expenditures, the Cox-Hirschhorn debt series will not generally be consistent with net borrowing as
deﬁned by NIPA.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 10
Suppose that households receive information before the econometric model rep-
resents this ﬂow as occuring. Because saddle-path conditions typically front-load
adjustment, the estimated impacts of identiﬁed shocks may be biased downward. Be-
cause we use timing restrictions to identify ﬁscal policy, we have a further motive for
investigating invertibility, since non-invertibility makes the timing restrictions inap-
plicable to the estimated shocks.
4.1. Explaining and Testing for Invertibility. Let the encompassing dynamical
system be given, in reduced form, by ft = ft−1B + ut, where ut = tJA
−1
0 .8 We
take the information set composed of current and past ft to reﬂect private agents’
information at t. We are interested in describing the dynamical system formed by
projecting ft onto a smaller space via a matrix P, which is to represent the information
set available to the econometrician; at time t the econometrician observes the history
of ys ≡ fsP for s ≤ t. The P matrix could, for example, simply select a subset of the
ft.
We report a simple test devised by Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent,
and Watson (2007) which determines whether or not shocks to the encompassing
system (ft) forecast the projected system’s (ftP) Wold innovations—that is, whether
the projected system is invertible. In the case where the projected system is not
invertible, it is possible to express the encompassing system’s innovations as a function
of the inﬁnite past and future of the projected system’s innovations. We rehearse this
derivation and then apply it to several choices of information set for the VAR.
A simple theoretical example illustrates what is a stake. Consider a model economy
with constant real interest rates, so that the stock of real debt bt evolves as bt =
rbt−1 − st, where r > 1 and st is the real surplus. Further suppose that there is
a policy rule that sets st = γbt−1 + et with |r − γ| < 1. Although agents know the
model and at time t observe current and past et, the econometrician at t observes only
current and past st. Applying the operator 1−rL to the law of motion for st implies
that the surplus behaves like st = (r−γ)st−1+et−ret−1. From the error term in this
equation, ht ≡ et − ret−1, one can recover the structural shock et by solving forward
to obtain et =
P∞
j=1 r−jht+j. However, it is impossible to represent eT as a function
purely of the history of the ht for t ≤ T, as is required for conventional identiﬁcation
schemes to recover the structural error from current and past information.
As is well known, the single-equation residual ht also has another representation in
terms of the Wold innovations for st, ˜ et ≡
P∞
j=0 r−j(et−j − ret−j−1).9 Unfortunately,
the Wold representation does not exhibit the present-value relation between debt and
surpluses, in the following sense. Substituting the present-value relation into the ﬂow
8It is convenient to suppress the constant in this section.
9See Lippi and Reichlin (1994) for a systematic method for obtaining such a representation.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 11
constraint, one sees that (Et − Et−1)
P∞
j=0 r−jst+j = 0. Suppose that one replaces
the expectations in this expression with conditional expectations with respect only















































j=0 r−jst+j = ˜ et
(r/γ)(1−r−2)
r−γ , which is generally not zero, as
the present-value relation requires. Because we want to explore the implications of
present-value balance, we must take some care to avoid invertibility problems.
Following Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent, and Watson (2007), de-
ﬁne matrices C = BP and D = JA
−1
0 P and suppose that D is invertible. The
invertibility of D says that the innovations to ft and ftP, relative to history of t—
the identiﬁed exogenous shocks—both span the same space. Consistent with this
assumption, when we assess the invertibility of a given projected model, we will ap-
proximate the encompassing model residual covariance matrix with the covariance
matrix of the ﬁrst K principal components of the encompassing model’s residuals, if
K is the dimension of the small model. Given the invertibility of D, one can solve
for t in the deﬁnition of yt to obtain t = ytD−1 − ft−1CD−1. Substituting this ex-





from which it follows immediately that the projected model is invertible, and ft can
be expressed as a function of current and past yt, if and only if B − CD−1JA
−1
0 is
stable. If this matrix is not stable, then one cannot express t in terms of the history
of ftP up to time t alone. Rather, as shown in appendix A, one can express t as a
function of past and future realizations of the projected model’s residuals.
Our approach is informal. We seek to ascertain whether the relatively small models
used, for example, in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004) are invertible
with respect to a larger model that is constructed to be suﬃciently rich to capture
the government’s present-value budget constraint. We proceed in two stages. First,
to be strictly comparable to work with relatively small models that include taxes
net of transfers, using Perotti (2004) as the benchmark, we examine the impacts
of government spending shocks, which are deﬁned consistently across all models.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 12
Then we consider tax and transfer shocks across three models that identify the two
expenditure components separately.
In the ﬁrst stage, the smallest model is that of Perotti (2004), consisting of taxes
net of transfers, spending, output, the three-month Treasury-bill rate, and inﬂation
(denoted P2004). We also consider a variant of this model in which investment is
included (denoted P2004I). Finally, the encompassing model is a 10-variable VAR,
consisting of all variables in P2004I plus it splits net taxes into taxes and transfers
separately and it adds the 10-year nominal interest rate and debt.
Figure 3 displays spending shock multipliers for all models mentioned above.10
Larger systems imply substantially larger output multipliers and movements in real
interest rates and prices. In fact, the price level moves from being signiﬁcantly lower
for about 15 years to being signiﬁcantly higher at longer horizons.
Government spending’s own dynamics and surplus dynamics also change in ways
that are important for ﬁscal ﬁnancing. Government spending becomes self-correcting
in larger systems, falling signiﬁcantly after 5 years and then rising again before con-
verging back to steady state. The surplus moves in mirror image, from deﬁcit to
surplus and back to deﬁcit. None of these dynamics are present in the smallest sys-
tem, P2004.
Figure 4 exhibits dynamic responses to all three ﬁscal shocks for the second stage, in
which tax and transfers shocks are separately identiﬁed. Responses to the government
spending shock are also shown, since this shock is identiﬁed in each model.
Smaller systems, P2004 T/Z and P2004I T/Z, appear to miss important output
and price level dynamics that are present in the encompassing system. In the larger
system, the point estimates of the output multiplier for taxes is biggest, while the
price level oscillates around zero until it becomes signiﬁcantly lower 25 years after
the initial tax increase. In contrast, transfers have no eﬀect on output in the large
systems after only a few years, whereas they seem quite potent in the smallest system,
P2004 T/Z.
The ﬁgures suggest that the smallest model, P2004, is perhaps too small, as the
addition of transfers, investment or debt all appear to lead to dynamical systems
which are relatively similar to each other, but notably diﬀerent from P2004. For
all shocks, the addition of either debt or investment to the information set results
in sharp increases in the output and price responses to ﬁscal policy shocks, relative
either to the smallest model (P2004) or to the version of P2004 where taxes and
transfers are disaggregated (P2004 T/Z). The intuition that P2004 is too small is
10Multipliers are calculated from log-responses by scaling all quantity variables by their average
share in GDP and then choosing the magnitude of the initial shock so that the associated policy
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conﬁrmed by the test of Fern´ andez-Villaverde, et al., which reveals the presence of
explosive eigenvalues in the criterion matrix. The addition of investment to the P2004
model brings the impulse response functions closer in line with those exhibited by the
largest system. Nevertheless, the Fern´ andez-Villaverde, et al. test again shows that
the P2004I models are not invertible with respect to the encompassing system.
We now investigate how serious is the non-invertibility detected by the eigenvalue
test. When the projected system is not invertible, its residuals may be expressed
as an inﬁnite series in the encompassing system’s innovations. Alternatively, non-
invertibility implies it is possible to write the encompassing system’s innovations, t,
as an inﬁnite series containing the projected model residuals’ past and future realiza-
tions, P
t . This second representation is worked out in appendix A and ﬁgure 5 dis-
plays the ﬁrst 100 years of coeﬃcients for the P2004 projected system. Schematically,
if the projected system has residuals P
t conditional on the history of the projected






t+jqj + φt (15)
where φt refers to terms dated t or earlier.
Intuitively, the coeﬃcients qj measure the information ﬂow regarding the true struc-
tural innovation to an econometrician who observes only the history of P
t . A long
train of non-negligible coeﬃcients indicates that the limited information set lags be-
hind the information set possessed by private agents by a considerable degree. Such
an information lag is, of course, particularly a problem for us, as we depend on
timing restrictions to identify ﬁscal policy. Furthermore, as ﬁscal policy shocks are
identiﬁed both in the projected models and the encompassing model, and we are pri-
marily concerned about ﬁscal policy impacts, we use the above equation to calculate
the loadings of the 10-variable system’s ﬁscal policy shocks on the projected model’s
identiﬁed ﬁscal policy shocks.12 Fiscal policy shocks from both models are weighted
by their standard deviations.
Figure 5 suggests a fairly substantial weighting on future realizations of the pro-
jected system’s residuals, over a considerable horizon, for the P2004 system. In
particular, leads of the projected system’s ﬁscal policy variables only gradually reveal
the larger model’s ﬁscal policy shocks: information about the true spending shock is
still being revealed by the projected model’s residuals several decades after the true
11Appendix A also explains how the qj’s are computed.
12In principle, the P
t vector includes all the shocks in the projected system. Of course, a ﬁnding
that the qj’s are non-zero for the ﬁscal subvector of P is suﬃcient to conclude non-invertibility of
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shock is realized. By contrast, the net tax shock appears relatively uninformative
about spending and taxes at any but the shortest horizons.
5. A Consistent Accounting Framework
5.1. The Intertemporal Budget Constraint. Let government debt in the hands
of the public at time t consist of zero coupon bonds with nominal face value Bt(j)
maturing at t+j, for all j ≥ 1. Further, let the total nominal value of debt outstanding
be Vt ≡
P∞
j=1 Bt(j)Qt(j) and let the nominal primary surplus be St. The surplus is
deﬁned as St = Tt−Gt−Zt, where Tt is tax receipts, Gt is government spending, and
Zt is transfer payments. The government budget identity is then13
∞ X
j=1
(Bt(j) − Bt−1(j + 1))Qt(j) = Bt−1(1) − St. (16)



























Bt−1(j + 1) and Pt is the price level.











































Bt−1(j + 1). (19)
13For expository clarity, we abstract from seigniorage in this section of the paper. The empirical
work, however, involves imposing the full budget constraint, including seigniorage, which for the
ﬂow budget constraint is deﬁned as (Mt − Mt−1)/Pt, where M is the monetary base. The addition
of seigniorage terms introduces no new conceptual issues.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 15
Thus, λtωt = ηt, where Etηt+1 = 0. To anticipate slightly, when discounted, the ωt
term in (17) will disappear in expectation, so it will not contribute to the present-
value expressions below. Innovations in ωt can nonetheless play an important role
by revaluing debt. Note that the presence of this term eliminates the stochastic
singularity which is at issue in Hansen, Roberds, and Sargent (1991) and is the reason
that Favero and Giavazzi (2007) tack the government budget constraint onto their
VAR as an identity.


















where, as usual, the transversality condition implies the absence of a bubble term in
(20).
For the purposes of linearization, it is convenient to express (20) and (17) in terms
of output. For any nominal variable Xt, let the corresponding variable xt ≡ Xt
Yt , where
Y is nominal output, and deﬁne γt as
Yt/Pt
Yt−1/Pt−1, the growth rate of real output. Scaled





















where vt is the market value of debt as a share of output.
If it were feasible to estimate an empirical model that included government bonds
and bond prices at all maturities, we would work directly with the ﬂow constraint in
(16). Because such a model is not practicable, we introduce ωt to express the budget
constraint in terms of the value of debt, v, the one-period interest rate, Qt−1(1), the
surplus, and other variables, as in (21). In the estimated model, ωt is a residual,
which is a linear combination of the VAR errors, that clears the period-by-period
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5.2. The VAR and Its Constraints. Now consider log-linearizations of (21) and
(22) around ﬁxed values for (v,γ,s,Pω/Y ) and the growth rate of λ which satisfy
both (21) and (18). Denote ˆ xt ≡ log(xt) − log(x). Deﬁning the one-period nominal
interest rate at date t−1 as Rt−1 = Q
−1




















where for steady state values of variables we use sample means. (Because ω can be





represents deviations of Ptωt
Yt
from its linearization point.) The linearized form of the present-value constraint is:









− ˆ Rt+s−1 + ˆ γt+s + ˆ πt+s + ˆ st+j
!
(24)




λt is the constant steady state growth rate of the marginal utility




s=1 Xt+s = 1
1−β
P∞
j=1 βjXt+j. Therefore, equation (24) can be
written












Ultimately, we wish to express the real quantity variables in levels, rather than as
fractions of output. Deﬁne ˜ vt ≡ log(Vt/Pt), ˜ πt ≡ log(πt), and ˜ Rt ≡ log(Rt). Using
the steady-state relations and eliminating output growth, equation (25) implies that












where k = −
β
1−β (ln(1/β)/β + τln(τ)/v − gln(g)/v − zln(z)/v) + ln(v) and s˜ st =
τ˜ τt − g˜ gt − z˜ zt. Thus, innovations to real debt must be balanced by innovations in
the present-value expression on the right-hand side. Moreover, this present-value can
itself be thought of as consisting of two components: the present-value of surpluses
at constant steady-state discount rates and a term which measures changes in the
expected path of those discount rates.
Suppose that the state of the model economy is characterized by the M-dimensional
factors ft which, in companion form, evolve according to the VAR process
ft = B0 + ft−1B + ut. (27)WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 17
Let a model variable xt be related to the underlying factors by a coeﬃcient matrix
Cx such that
˜ xt = ftCx. (28)
The government budget constraint in equation (26) implies the following restrictions







































Expression (30) imposes restrictions on the deterministic growth components of the
VAR. Because our focus is on innovation accounting and the deterministic components
are irrelevant, we do not impose (30) on the estimated VAR.
In addition, if the matrix βB possesses explosive eigenvalues, we must impose
conditions which guarantee that the inﬁnite sum in (26) exists. Speciﬁcally, let W be
the matrix of right eigenvectors of βB and suppose that λj is an eigenvalue such that



















Note that the VAR does not contain the term ωt in equation (17). Variations in
this variable thus implicitly maintain the government’s ﬂow budget constraint. As is
evident above, however, the present-value constraint implies that the ﬂow constraint
holds in expectation.
5.3. Estimation Procedure. We conduct estimation and inference in a least-squares
framework. As before, let the VAR be ft = B0 + ft−1B + ut, for t = 0,...,T. Then
the objective function is min
P
t u0
tΣut. Let f be a data matrix whose rows consist
of the variables ft, for each t > 0 and deﬁne f− as the corresponding lagged data
matrix. Deﬁne W− ≡ [1,f−] and b ≡ vec([B0
0,B0]0). The part of the objective func-
tion relating to b can be re-written (b −ˆ b)0S(b −ˆ b), where ˆ b ≡ I ⊗ (W 0
−W−)−1(W 0
−f)
and S = (Σ ⊗ Z0Z). We maximize this objective function subject to a constraint
C0b = C−. The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is S(b − ˆ b) = C0
0λ0. It follows
that C0b = C− = C0ˆ b + C0S−1C0
0λ0, or that b = ˆ b + S−1C0
0(C0S−1C0
0)−1(C− − C0ˆ b).
From equation (29), we have that [0,I][B0
0,B0]0C0 = C−, so that the constraint is
(C0
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and
C− ≡ (Cv + CR) (33)
Estimates presented here are from a feasible GLS procedure, iterated until conver-
gence, in which Σ−1 is a consistent estimate of the residual covariance matrix.
The distribution of the estimated quantities is obtained by Monte-Carlo simulation,
using the unconstrained VAR as the data generating process. Least-squares estimates
of persistence parameters are known to be downward-biased in small samples. We
correct for the downward bias in the Monte-Carlo studies using the technique of Kilian
(1998).
The discount factor β plays an important role in computing present values. We
compute this from the steady state government budget constraint after imposing that
1/β = R/π and using the sample means for taxes, spending, transfers, and debt as a
share of GDP. The calculated value is β = .9967.
5.4. Impulse Response Functions and Multipliers. Figure 6 reports multipliers
for both the constrained and unconstrained VAR. Sixty-eight percent conﬁdence in-
tervals are computed for the unconstrained baseline VAR. Responses of ﬁscal variables
and output are in dollar units, so the output responses are conventional multipliers
relative to the initial unit shock to the ﬁscal variable. Price level and real interest
rate responses are in logs and may be interpreted as percentage changes.
Over horizons of 10 or more years, output responses from the constrained model fall
outside the 68 percent intervals of the unconstrained model. For prices, diﬀerences
emerge only over still longer horizons. Dynamic interactions among ﬁscal variables
are also diﬀerent in the two systems, as ﬁgure 7 shows.14
The baseline VAR reproduces many of the standard ﬁndings in the literature. Upon
a surprise tax increase, output falls, while a spending increase generates a rise in
output. Moreover, also consistent with the literature, spending shocks generate short-
lived crowding out of investment and a prolonged period of lower prices.
The most dramatic eﬀect of imposing the present-value constraint is on output.
After about 10 years, the output response leaves the conﬁdence interval for every
ﬁscal policy shock. Following a tax increase, the output multiplier is twice as large
when the present-value restriction is imposed, while for government spending the
14Impulse response functions from the identiﬁed ﬁscal policy shocks always lie within the 95
percent conﬁdence bands for the ﬁrst 40 years and these impulse response functions are also typically
within the 90 percent conﬁdence intervals as well. This failure to reject the present-value constraint
is consistent with the ﬁndings in Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Davig (2005), and Giannitsarou and
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output multiplier is higher by roughly the same amount. The output multiplier for
transfers actually turns negative over longer horizons when the restriction is imposed.
The persistent impact of ﬁscal policy shocks on prices is also noteworthy. After 40
years, the constrained VAR forecasts prices as 20 percent below their starting point,
while, after an initial period of deﬂation following a spending shock, after 40 years,
the price level is a startling 30 percent above its initial position.
In light of our coming discussion of present-value ﬁnancing, it is worth keeping
track of the path of the surplus components (see ﬁgure 7). Especially after tax and
spending shocks, particularly at longer horizons, the imposition of the present-value
constraint produces large eﬀects. By around 25 years after the initial tax shock, the
constrained VAR predicts an almost 40 percent fall in transfers. This fall in transfers
is so persistent that by 40 years, transfers have still only recovered to 16 percent
below their initial level. By this point, taxes themselves, after experiencing a positive
unit shock, have fallen by 12 percent. Perhaps surprisingly, the net eﬀect of these
diﬀerences between the two systems does not appear much to aﬀect the forecast of
debt itself, at least, within the ﬁrst 40 years. Rather, the imposition of the constraint
tends to exaggerate the responses of both taxes and transfers, so that the net eﬀect
is muted, as seen in the primary surplus responses in ﬁgure 6. Indeed, the impact of
the present-value constraint on spending responses appears slight.
6. How Debt-Financed Fiscal Shocks Have Been Financed
We turn now to the forward-looking aspect of government ﬁnance. In particular,
we wish to ascertain what combination of adjustments in the expected path of ﬁscal
policy instruments and discount rates rationalizes the decision of private agents to
hold government debt at prevailing market prices. We also ask some questions about
the dynamics of ﬁscal adjustment. How does adjustment depend on the nature of the
ﬁscal policy shock? Over what horizon must one forecast in order to see present-value
balance?
6.1. Fiscal Finance: Present Values. The basic present-value decomposition pre-
viously described is displayed in table 4, which shows present-value components fol-
lowing unit responses from the policy instruments associated with each type of shock.
The components are scaled so that they add to the initial debt innovation, shown in
the third column. The standard deviations of the ﬁscal policy shocks are also shown
to indicate the typical magnitude of the present-value adjustment associated with
each shock. While spending shocks have a far lower variance than do tax shocks,
they generate much more violent movements in present values and in some periods
may dominate the eﬀect of the tax shocks. As we shall see in section 7, the turn of
the millennium features a number of such episodes.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 20
Diﬀerent ﬁscal policy shocks are ﬁnanced very diﬀerently in present-value terms.
For tax shocks, both the discount rate and the present value of surpluses at constant
rates move to support debt, with the lion’s share of the work done by changes in
the present value of surpluses. This coincides with the usual picture of how debt
is ﬁnanced in present-value. By contrast, the role of the discount rate is much less
intuitive for spending and transfer shocks. In the case of surprise spending increases,
in fact, while taxes do rise sharply and persistently, their contribution is swamped by
the combination of higher spending and transfers. The present-value of surpluses at
constant discount rates actually falls. Present-value balance is maintained only by
drastic and prolonged fall in real interest rates, the bulk of which is accounted for a
fall in the nominal interest rate.
The story is reversed for surprise increases in transfers. The initial transfers increase
is quite transient and, in the longer horizon, lower expected transfers account for most
of the present-value of surpluses, with taxes and spending oﬀsetting each other. The
discount rate resists present-value balance, again largely due to a sharp rise in the
path of nominal interest rates.
For each type of ﬁscal policy shock, taxes and transfers experience sizeable but
oﬀsetting movements in present value, as was apparent from the impulse response
functions. Moreover, except in the case of transfers, the present value of taxes moves
to support the innovation in debt, while, consequently, the present-value of transfers
moves against it. In the case of transfers, it is spending and taxes which move in
oﬀsetting fashion, while transfers bear the burden of adjustment.
6.2. Distribution of Present-Value Components. In this section, we report and
discuss Monte Carlo simulation results concerning the distribution of the present-
value components. For this purpose, we draw 14,000 times from the residuals of the
constrained VAR, using the constrained VAR as the data generating process.
Tables 5 and 6 show that the sign of the initial debt innovation is quite precise
for tax and spending shocks, while the small impact magnitude of the debt response
for transfers prevents us from making similar statements regarding the impact of a
transfer shock. Substantial probability mass appears to be on the event that the
primary surplus moves with the debt innovation following a tax shock. Surpluses
move against debt following a spending shock, although we cannot reject the contrary
possibility at the ﬁve percent level. This conclusion is supported by table 7, which
reports the fraction of Monte Carlo draws in which the listed components move in the
same direction as the debt innovation. In slightly more than 90 percent of draws, the
present-value of surpluses supports the debt innovation following a tax shock, while
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Regarding the role of the present-value surplus components taken separately, the
conﬁdence bands are wide in all cases, except following the spending shock. In that
case, however, in over 97 percent of draws, the present value of taxes moves to support
debt, but is more than oﬀset by counter-moves in the present values of spending and
transfers, both of which move against debt. In the case of the other shocks, while
there is a tendency for taxes to support the debt innovation following a tax shock,
this occurs in only 75 percent of cases and, indeed, the 95 percent conﬁdence interval
is quite broad. Finally, note that the addition of seigniorage to the primary surplus
does not materially aﬀect any of these conclusions.
6.3. Fiscal Finance: Dynamics. The summary accounting in the previous section,
while informative, does not reveal much of the dynamic structure which supports
present-value balance. In this section, we aim to illuminate this topic by examin-
ing the horizon over which present-value balance is attained. The funding horizon
addresses the issue of how far into the future one must forecast in order to see present-
value balance. For some shocks, the answer is “quite a long time.”
The forecast horizons for each type of ﬁscal policy shock are illustrated by ﬁgure 8.
The lines represent truncated present-values of discounted surpluses, up to the date
indicated. Each series is scaled by the initial debt innovation, so that asymptotically,
each must converge to plus one (for spending and transfers) or minus one (for taxes).
Of the three types of shocks, the tax shock generates by far the mildest variations
in funding, but even here the truncated present-value repeatedly over- and under-
shoots its asymptotic target by modest amounts. Indeed, after the 10-year mark,
the truncated present value for tax shocks is essentially a scaled-down version of the
present value for transfer shocks.
Most dramatic, however, are the responses of the present value of surpluses to
shocks in transfers and spending. First, the time over which one must forecast in order
to see present-value balance is on the order of 100 years or so. Second, at intermediate
points the truncated present values experience wide swings. For example, a truncated
forecast following a transfer shock would, at 15 years, show a present-value deﬁcit of
16 times its asymptotic value, while a 40-year forecast would reveal a surplus of over
four times the asymptotic value.
7. Conclusion
Our ﬁndings may be split into two parts. First, we ﬁnd that very small VAR
systems, in particular, systems which include neither debt nor investment, may fail
to be invertible relative to systems which do include these variables. Second, we have
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investigated how present-value balance is achieved following identiﬁed ﬁscal policy
shocks.
Two historical episodes nicely illustrate our central ﬁndings regarding present-value
balance. Consider ﬁrst the tax shock created by the tax rebate in the second quarter
of 1975. Figure 9 displays debt innovations attributable to ﬁscal policy shocks and
the means of their present-value funding between 1972 and 1978. According to the
constrained VAR, in quarter 2 of 1975, a large ﬁscal-policy-induced rise in debt occurs.
Consistent with table 4 and with the idea that this innovation represents a tax shock,
the bulk of the surprise rise in debt is supported, in present value, by expected
increases in the primary surplus, while expected changes in the path of real interest
rates plays a minor, but supporting role. Indeed, one sees that the lead role in
supporting the surprise tax cut is the expectation of higher future tax revenue, albeit
partially oﬀset by higher future transfers and spending. Moreover, from ﬁgures 4
and 8, the tax cut should have been expected to be highly transient, as a pure tax
cut would have been enduringly reversed after only two-and-a-half years.15 By the
same token, the public would have foreseen very persistent eﬀects from this seemingly
transient tax cut—eﬀects which would propagate 50 years or more, before quiescence.
This pattern, however, is not the only one in the sample. Now consider the present-
value support of the last seven years of ﬁscal policy shocks, shown in ﬁgure 10. During
this period, there are multiple instances in which the innovation to debt has not been
supported by corresponding movements in the present value of primary surpluses, at
constant discount rates. Rather, as this period features several large spending shocks,
the present value of surpluses has frequently moved against the debt innovation, due
to the extreme persistence of the spending response, which remains far above its
initial level for decades. Again, to see present-value balance in forecasts, one would
have to extrapolate out 50 to 100 years, while truncated forecasts before this horizon
would have produced wildly misleading impressions of imbalance.
The essential lessons of this paper are therefore these: whether or not the primary
surplus will adjust to support innovations in debt depends on nature of the shock
to debt. For taxes and transfers, it appears as though the surplus will so adjust,
while, with spending, it will not. Furthermore, the impact of ﬁscal policy shocks is
highly persistent and forecasts must be carried out well beyond the 50-year mark to
see present-value balance.
15Blinder (1981) studies the eﬀects of this episode on consumption.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 23
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Parameters
β γ γN θ A α δ
.99 1 1 3.48 1 2/3 .025
Policy Rule Output Elasticities
ϕG ϕτ ϕZ
0 1.5065 −.15
Steady State Policy Variables
G/Y T/Y Z/Y B/Y
.0839 .1771 .0882 .495
Table 1. Parameter settings in the real business cycle model. Steady
state policy variables calibrated to match U.S. data used to estimated
identiﬁed VARs. Policy shocks have ﬁrst-order serial correlation pa-
rameter of .80. Policy rule output elasticities calibrated from Perotti
(2004) and steady state policy variables.
Financed by (Present Value)
Shock to T G Z R S
G −.03 −4.03 5.14 −.08 1.08
T −3.24 0 4.25 −.004 1.004
Z 0 0 1 0 1
Table 2. Real business cycle model. The fraction of positive gov-
ernment debt innovations, due to shocks listed in the ﬁrst column,
that are ﬁnanced by each of the components of the government bud-
get. Simulation assumes that transfers clear the government budget:
γZ = 1,γG = γτ = 0. R denotes the stochastic discount factor; S
denotes net surplus, derived by summing columns labeled T, G, and Z.
Y π
Tax Elasticity 1.5065 .3248
Spending Elasticity 0 −.5
Transfer Elasticity −.15 −1
Table 3. Calibrated elasticities in identiﬁed VAR with taxes and
transfers separated.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 27
Shock to Std Dev ∆B T G Z S R
Taxes .0464 −.2365 −1.9339 .4260 1.3782 −.1296 −.0835
Spending .0090 .0375 2.3501 −0.8115 −1.6848 −.1462 .1701
Transfers .0056 .0035 −.1976 .1891 .1114 .1028 −.1187
Table 4. Policy Block Present-Value Funding Decomposition.
Present-values calculated following a unit shock.
Present-Value Shock to
Component Taxes Spending Transfers
∆B [−.2498,−.2241] [.0229,.0519] [−.0056,.0121]
T [−1.6841,.7103] [.7657,2.3250] [−.4920,−.0071]
G [−.4301,.3920] [−.7947,−.2804] [.1012,.2978]
Z [−.4385,1.2244] [−.1720,−.5546] [−.0424,.3411]
S [−.2320,−.0517] [−.2085,−.0395] [.0564,.1449]
S + Seigniorage [−.2503,−.0407] [−.2197,−.0221] [.0666,.1707]
Table 5. Monte Carlo Distribution for Present-Value Components.
Reports 68 percent conﬁdence intervals, computed from 14,000 Monte
Carlo draws, using the constrained VAR as the data generating process.
Present-Value Shock to
Component Taxes Spending Transfers
∆B [−.2638 − .2118] [.0656,.0096] [−.0144,.0206]
T [−5.7325,1.2699] [.1248,4.5300] [−1.1007,.9158]
G [−.7057,1.4565] [−1.4197,−.0508] [−.1297,.5091]
Z [−.8787,4.5243] [−3.4649,−.0628] [−.7640,.7780]
S [−.4194,.1472] [−.3782,.0774] [.0000,.2275]
S + Seigniorage [−.4935,.1658] [−.4041,.1300] [.0021,.2713]
Table 6. Monte Carlo Distribution for Present-Value Components.
Reports 95 percent conﬁdence intervals, computed from 14,000 Monte
Carlo draws, using the constrained VAR as the data generating process.
Shock to T G Z S
Taxes .7479 .3970 .2483 .9157
Spending .9747 .0235 .0263 .0801
Transfers .4185 .6242 .5636 .6395
Table 7. Fraction of MC Draws (M = 14,000) in which listed compo-
nent moves in the same direction as the debt innovation.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 28


































































Fiscal Effects: Transfers, Spending & Taxes Adjust







Figure 1. Responses to ﬁscal shocks when taxes clear the budget:
γτ = 1,γZ = γG = 0. Solid line: transfers adjust; dashed line: taxes
adjust; dotted line: spending adjusts.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 29
















Figure 2. Government debt funding horizons for ﬁscal shocks when
taxes clear the budget. Solid line: tax shock; dotted-dashed line: spend-



































Figure 3. Selected responses following a spending shock. Black solid
line (P2004): VAR system includes net tax revenue, spending, output,
prices and the 3-month T-bill rate. Black dashed line (P2004I): Same as
P2004 but adds investment. Grey lines (Baseline VAR and 68 percent
error band): VAR includes tax revenue, spending, transfers, output,
prices, 3-month T-bill rate, 10-year bond rate, monetary base, invest-
ment, debt. r is the ex-ante real interest rate and S is the real primary



























































































Figure 4. Selected multipliers following a tax, spending, and transfers
shocks. Black solid line (P2004 T/Z): VAR system includes net tax
revenue, spending, output, prices and the 3-month T-bill rate. Black
dashed line (P2004I T/Z): Same as P2004 but adds investment. Grey
lines (Baseline VAR and 68 percent error band): VAR includes tax
revenue, spending, transfers, output, prices, 3-month T-bill rate, 10-
year bond rate, monetary base, investment, debt. r is the ex-ante real
interest rate and S is the real primary surplus.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 32










Forward Loading of Tax Shock
 
 








Forward Loading of Spending Shock
 
 

















Figure 5. Magnitude of coeﬃcients on future projected-model resid-
uals in expansion of encompassing-model ﬁscal policy shocks. All vari-
























































































Figure 6. Responses to ﬁscal shocks with and without present-value
constraint imposed. Grey solid line and dotted 68 percent error band:
VAR includes taxes, government spending, transfers, output, price
level, three-month Treasury bill rate, 10-year Treasury bond yield, mon-
etary base, government debt and investment. Darker solid line: VAR
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Figure 7. Selected responses to ﬁscal shocks. Grey solid and dot-
ted lines 68 percent error band: VAR includes taxes (T), government
spending (G), transfers (Z), output (Y ), price level (P), three-month
Treasury bill rate (R), 10-year Treasury bond yield, monetary base,
government debt (V ) and investment (I). Dashed line: VAR system
with intertemporal government budget constraint imposed.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 35








Present−Value Funding Horizons for Spending and Transfers Shocks
 
 







Present−Value Funding Horizon for a Tax Shock
Quarters after Shock
Transfers Spending
Figure 8. Present-Value Budget Balance Horizon. Top panel: Dashed
line: truncated present-value following a spending shock; solid line:
truncated present-value following transfer shock. Bottom panel: trun-
cated present-value following a policy shock to tax revenue.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 36



























Figure 9. Present-value ﬁnancing of innovations to debt (1972-1978).
Top panel: present-value contributions broken down by policy instru-
ment. Bottom panel: present-value components broken down into total
surplus contribution and total discount rate contribution. Black line in
both panels: debt innovation.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 37





























Figure 10. Present-value ﬁnancing of recent ﬁscal policy shocks. Top
panel: present-value components broken down into total surplus con-
tribution and total discount rate contribution. Bottom panel: present-
value contributions broken down by policy instrument. Black line in
both panels: debt innovation.WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 38
Appendix A. Derivation of the Forward-Looking Part of Baseline
Model Residuals
Let the baseline dynamical system be given by ft = ft−1A + tB and Γ ≡ A −
CD−1B. Γ has QZ decomposition A = Q0
AKAZ0
A where QAZA = VA. Deﬁne Λ ≡
KAV
−1
A . Then ftQ0 = ft−1Q0Λ + ytD−1B. Let the explosive modes be denoted by
w
+
t and stable modes by w0
t with a corresponding partition for QA, ZA and Λ. By
convention, the explosive modes are in the right lower corners. Solving the explosive
































QA(I − AL) (36)
Suppose now that one is interested in the representation of residuals from a ﬁnite-
order VAR. Without loss of generality in this case, we can take the dynamics to be
given by yt =
P∞
j=0 ut−kGk, where ut is the residual. As before, let G have QZ
decomposition G = Q0
GKGZ0






















QA(I − AL) (37)













2 for arbitrary matrices





































where Jt depends only on the history of u up to date t. Finally, therefore, the
















A(I − AL)(B ∗ B0)−1 + ...
(39)WHAT HAS FINANCED GOVERNMENT DEBT? 39
A.1. Calculating the forward looking coeﬃcients. From equation (39), given
the encompassing system’s dynamics (matrices A and B), and a matrix G which
represents the projected system, one can calculate explicitly the coeﬃcients in the
forward part of the expansion. In our case, the matrices A and G are obtained by
simple OLS estimates of the relevant VARs. The matrix B, which represents the
encompassing system’s covariance matrix, is chosen so that BP is invertible. This is
done by choosing B equal to K eigenvectors of the covariance matrix with the largest
eigenvalues, where K is the dimension of smaller system’s covariance matrix, i.e., we
approximate the encompassing system’s shocks with its ﬁrst K principal components.
Finally, as we are interested in the loadings of ﬁscal policy shocks on “ﬁscal policy
shocks” identiﬁed in the smaller system, we hit both sides of (39) with a matrix PBP,


















A(I − AL)(B ∗ B0)−1PBP + ...
(40)
In turn, it is possible to express the small system’s residuals ut as ut = uFP
t γ + uY
t
where uFP
t is the “identiﬁed” ﬁscal policy shock from the small model and uY
t is
the orthogonal (with respect to the history of the ut) component. (The projection
coeﬃcient γ is easily calculated from the PBP matrix for the smaller system and
that system’s covariance matrix.) Finally, in order to give some better sense of the
scale of the coeﬃcients, the ﬁscal policy shocks are both weighted by their standard
deviations. That is, let S be a diagonal matrix consisting of the inverse standard
deviations of each of the FP and let Su be the corresponding diagonal matrix for the


















A(I − AL)(B ∗ B0)−1PBPS + ...
(41)
where “...” refers to terms not of interest.